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Abstract
Kuroda and Nagai [9] state that the factor process in the Risk Sensitive control
Asset Management (RSCAM) is stable under the Fo¨llmer-Schweizer minimal
martingale measure . Fleming and Sheu [5] and more recently Fo¨llmer and
Schweizer [6] have observed that the role of the minimal martingale measure
in this portfolio optimization is yet to be established. In this article we aim
to address this question by explicitly connecting the optimal wealth allocation
to the minimal martingale measure. We achieve this by using a “trick” of
observing this problem in the context of model uncertainty via a two person
zero sum stochastic differential game between the investor and an antagonistic
market that provides a probability measure. We obtain some startling insights.
Firstly, if short-selling is not permitted and if the factor process evolves under
the minimal martingale measure then the investor’s optimal strategy can only
be to invest in the riskless asset (i.e. the no-regret strategy). Secondly, if the
factor process and the stock price process have independent noise, then even if
the market allows short selling, the optimal strategy for the investor must be
the no-regret strategy while the factor process will evolve under the minimal
martingale measure .
Keywords: Risk Sensitive control Asset Management; Minimal martingale
measure; zero sum stochastic differential game; stability.
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 49L02
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1. Introduction
Risk sensitive control Asset Management (RSCAM) balances the investors interest in maximizing the
expected growth rate of wealth against his aversion to risk due to deviations of the actually realized rate from
the expectation for a finite time horizon. The subjective notion of investors risk aversion is parameterized
by a single variable say θ. In RSCAM we consider the following criterion to be maximized. For a given
θ > −2, θ 6= 0 and for time horizon T <∞, find wealth allocation control denoted by h(t) , the risk- sensitive
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expected growth rate up to time horizon T criterion J(v, h, T ; θ) defined by,
J(v, h, T ; θ) ,
−2
θ
logE[exp [
−θ
2
logV h(T )]] (1)
where V h(T ) is time-T portfolio value. An asymptotic expansion around θ = 0 for the above criterion yields
J(v, h, T ; θ) = E[V h(T )]−
θ
2
V ar(V h(T )) +O(θ2); V h(0) = v
As is obvious from the preceding equation, θ > 0 corresponds to risk averse investor, θ < 0 is risk seeking
investor and θ = 0 is a risk neutral investor. Hence the optimal expected utility function depends on θ and
is a generalization of the traditional stochastic control in the sense that now the degree of risk aversion of
the investor is explicitly parameterized through θ rather than importing it in the problem via an externally
defined utility function. For this reason investment optimization models have been popularly reformulated
as risk-sensitive control problems . For a general reference on risk-sensitive control, refer Whittle [11].
Risk-sensitive control was first applied to solve financial problems by Lefebvre and Montulet [10] in a
corporate finance context and by Fleming [4] in a portfolio selection context. A RSCAM problem with m
securities and n (economic) factors was introduced by Bielecki and Pliska [3]. Their factor model however
made a rather strong assumption that the factor process and the securities price process in their financial
optimization model had independent noise. A generalization to this model, relaxing this assumption was
made by Kuroda and Nagai [9] who introduced an elegant solution method based on a change of measure
argument which transforms the risk sensitive control problem into a linear exponential of a quadratic
regulator. They solved the associated HJB PDE over a finite time horizon and then studied the properties
of the ergodic HJB PDE. We go about formally stating the problem by first describing the factor model for
a risk averse investor.
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) be the filtered probability space. Consider a market of m + 1 ≥ 2 securities and
n ≥ 1 factors. We assume that the set of securities includes one bond whose price is governed by the ODE
dS0(t) = r(t)S0(t)dt, S0(0) = s0 (2)
where r(t) is a deterministic function of t. The other security prices are assumed to satisfy the following
SDE’s
dSi(t) = Si(t){(a+AX(t))idt+
n+m∑
k=1
σikdW
k(t)}, Si(0) = si, i = 1, ...,m., (3)
where the component wise factor process satisfies,
dX i(t) = (b+BX(t))idt+
n+m∑
k=1
λikdW
k(t), X i(0) = xi, i = 1, ..., n.
Vectorically X(t) = (X1(t), ..., Xn(t))
′
(where the symbol ′ signifies transpose) satisfies the following dy-
namics,
dX(t) = (b +BX(t))dt+ ΛdW (t), X(0) = x ∈ Rn. (4)
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Here, W (t) = (W k(t))k=1,...,n+m is an n+m dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on the filtered
probability space. The model parameters A,B are respectively m× n, n× n, n× (m+ n) constant matrices
and a ∈ Rm , b ∈ Rn. The constant matrix [σik] , Σ, i = 1, 2....,m; k = 1, 2, ..., (n + m). Matrix ΣΣ
′
is
assumed positive definite. Similarly, [λik] , Λ, i = 1, 2...., n; k = 1, 2, ..., (n+m). We denote l
′
as transpose of
l. Likewise let |v| be a suitable vector norm for any vector v while ||M || symbolizes a suitable matrix norm for
any matrix M . As discussed earlier, as part of generalizing the Bielecki and Pliska factor model [3], Kuroda
and Nagai [9] assume that the factor process and the securities price process is correlated i.e. ΣΛ
′
6= 0.
The investment strategy which represents proportional allocation of total wealth in the ith security Si(t) is
denoted by hi(t) for i = 0, 1, ...,m and we set, S(t) := (S1(t), S2(t), ..., Sm(t))
′
, h(t) := (h1(t), ..., hm(t))
′
and
Gt = σ(S(u), X(u);u ≤ t) is the filtration generated by the underlying stock price process and the factor
process. Let H(T ) be a space of Rm valued controls for the investor meaning we say that h(t) ∈ H(T ) where
h(t) is Gt-progressively measurable stochastic processes such that
∑m
i=1 h
i(t) + h0(t) = 1, P (
∫ T
0 |h(t)|
2
dt <
∞) = 1 and E[e
θ2
2
∫
T
0
h
′
tΣΣ
′
htdt] <∞. For given h(t) ∈ H(T ) the process V (t) = V h(t) is determined by the
SDE,
dV h(t)
V h(t)
= h0(t)r(t)dt +
m∑
i=1
hi(t){(a+AX(t))idt+
m+n∑
k=1
σikdW
k(t)}; V h(0) = v.
which can be written vectorically as,
dV h(t)
V h(t)
= (r(t) + h
′
(t)δ(t))dt+ h
′
(t)ΣdW (t); V h(0) = v. (5)
where δ(t) , a+AX(t)− r(t)1. From the expression of security/stock price dynamics S(t) (3), it is obvious
that the market is incomplete (as it has m securities and n+m Brownian drivers) and hence there exist many
equivalent martingale measures or EMM’s. We refer the reader to Karatzas and Shreve [8] for a general
treatment on market incompleteness. One such candidate equivalent martingale measure is the Fo¨llmer-
Schweizer minimal martingale measure. For the continuous adapted stock price process S = (S(t))0≤t≤T ,
the minimal martingale measure P∗ (say)is the unique equivalent local martingale measure with the property
that local P-martingale part of S are also local P∗-martingales. For the Fo¨llmer-Schweizer minimal martingale
measure P∗, the density process is given by the following dynamics,
dP∗
dP
= E(−
∫
0
((Σ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1) δ)
′
dW )T (6)
Kuroda and Nagai [9] observe that the condition of stability of the matrix B − ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1A induces
stability on the factor process X = (X(t))0≤t≤T under the minimal martingale measure. Fleming and Sheu
[5] and more recently Fo¨llmer and Schweizer [6] have observed that this observation and more significantly the
role of the minimal martingale measure in this portfolio asset management problem is yet to be established.
In this article we address these questions. We do so by conceptualizing the RSCAM as a zero sum stochastic
differential game between (a market) that provides a probability measure that works antagonistically against
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another player (the investor) who otherwise wants to maximize the risk-sensitive criterion. We call this game
(GI)(refer (10)). We need to determine the controls that forms the saddle point equilibrium to this game.
This will then illuminate the explicit dependence between controls h(t) and the probability measure which
would then lead us to connect the role played by the minimal martingale measure. We achieve this objective
through the following road map:
Key Steps
Step 1: We re-formulate the game (GI) into an auxiliary game characterized by the exponential of integral
criterion that involves just the factor process X . We call this game (GII)(refer equation (17)).
Step 2: We then provide verification lemma for (GII).
Step 3: We then obtain the optimal controls and deduce the connection between the minimal martingale
measure and investor’s optimal strategy.
Step 4: To complete the analysis we end by showing that the controls hence obtained while solving game
(GII) in Step 3 infact also constitutes saddle-point equilibrium strategy for the original game (GI).
2. Worst-Case Risk sensitive Zero sum stochastic differential game
As discussed in the introduction, the Kuroda and Nagai investment market model is incomplete. We
are interested in understanding the influence minimal martingale measure has on this portfolio optimization
problem. We conjure an approach, whereby we can explicitly characterize the dependence between the
minimal martingale measure and the control variable h. Formally we set to do this is to define a “market
world”. The market world is a space of probability measures defined as
P , {Pη,ξ : (η, ξ) = (η(t), ξ(t))T≥t≥0 ∈ O(T )}
on (Ω,F), where O(T ) denotes the set of deterministic controls η(t) ∈ Rn×(n+m) and ξ(t) ∈ R1×(n+m) which
are continuous over the compact set [0, T ] and hence bounded. For (η(t), ξ(t)) ∈ O(T ) for fixed time horizon
T , the restriction of Pη,ξ to the σ− field FT is given by the Radon-Nikodym density
Dη,ξ(T ) ,
dPη,ξ
dP
|FT , E
(∫
0
(η(t)
′
X(t) + ξ
′
(t))
′
dW (t)
)
T
. (7)
with respect to the reference measure P. Here E(·) is the Dolea´ns-Dade exponential. We now show that for
(η, ξ) ∈ O(T ), Pη,ξ is a probability measure.
Lemma 2.1. E[Dη,ξ(T )] = 1 for all (η, ξ) ∈ O(T ).
Proof. The process X(t) in (4) is a Gaussian process. From (4) and the Gronwall’s inequality we have
E|X(t)| ≤ (E|X(0)| + |b|T ) exp(||B||t) and Cov(X(t)) = Λ
′
Λt where Cov is the covariance function. As
η(t), ξ(t) are deterministic controls and are bounded, φ(t) , X
′
(t)η(t) + ξ(t) is also a Gaussian process with
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bounded mean and covariance on a finite time interval [0, T ]. Hence by an application of Novikov’s condition,
the Dolea´ns-Dade exponential in (7) is a P- martingale. A standard proof of this fact can be seen in Lemma
3.1.1 in Bensoussan [1].
We now re-evaluate the optimization criterion J under the new probability measure Pη,ξ and call it J˜ which
is defined as
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ) =
−2
θ
logEη,ξ[exp [
−θ
2
logV h,η,ξ(T )]].
where the portfolio value under the new probability measure Pη,ξ is given by
dV h,η,ξ(t)
V h,η,ξ(t)
=
[
r(t) + h
′
(t)(δ(t) − Σ(η
′
(t)X(t) + ξ
′
(t)))
]
dt+ h
′
(t)ΣdW η,ξ(t),
V h,η,ξ(0) = v. (8)
From Lemma 2.1 we have that Pη,ξ is a probability measure for (η, ξ) ∈ O(T ).
From the standard result in Girsanov [7], under the probability measure Pη,ξ,
W η,ξ(t) ,W (t) +
∫ t
0
(η
′
(s)X(s) + ξ
′
(s))ds,
is a standard Brownian motion process and therefore the factor process X(t), vectorically, satisfies the
following SDE
dX(t) = (b+BX(t)− Λ(η
′
(t)X(t) + ξ
′
(t)))dt + ΛdW η,ξ(t), (9)
Remark 2.1. From equations (6) and (7) , it is clear that Pη,ξ is a minimal martingale measure for ηˆ(t) ,
η(t) = A
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σ and ξˆ(t) , ξ(t) = (a− r(t)1)
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σ.
Kuroda and Nagai [9] have stated that under the condition of stability of the matrix B − ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1A,
the factor process X(t) is stable under the minimal martingale measure. In light of our Remark 2.1, we
validate this statement now.
Remark 2.2. As η(t) = ηˆ(t) and ξ(t) = ξˆ(t) corresponds to the minimal martingale measure, the dynamics
of X(t) under the minimal martingale measure can be re-written as
dX(t) =
(
b− ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1(a− r(t)1) + (B − ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1A)X(t)
)
dt+ ΛdW ηˆ,ξˆ(t).
We are interested in finding the behavior of the solution X(t) as t→∞. The coefficient of the X(t) term in
the drift part of above equation is B − ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1A. Since by assumption this coefficient term is a stable
matrix, X(t) is hence stable under the minimal martingale measure.
We need to now pin down the influence the minimal martingale measure has on this portfolio optimization
problem to further resolve the inquiry posed by Fleming and Sheu [5].
To do so, as stated earlier, we conceptualize this problem as a game between a player termed as the market
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against the investor. We denote this game as (GI).
Game GI Obtain hˆ ∈ H(T ) and (ηˆ, ξˆ) ∈ O(T ) such that,
J˜(v, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, T ; θ) = sup
h∈H(T )
inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
−2
θ
logEη,ξ[exp [
−θ
2
log V h,η,ξ(T )]]
= inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
−2
θ
logEη,ξ[exp [
−θ
2
log V h,η,ξ(T )]]. (10)
Our intention is to re-write the objective function J˜ purely in terms of the factor process X . We set to
achieve this by defining,
g(x, h, η, ξ, r; θ) ,
1
2
(
θ
2
+ 1)h
′
ΣΣ
′
h− r − h
′
(
δ − Σ(η
′
x+ ξ
′
)
)
.
(11)
Hence from (11), we have
−
θ
2
dlog V h,η,ξ(t) =
(
θ
2
g(X(t), h(t), η(t), ξ(t), r(t); θ) −
θ2
8
h
′
(t)ΣΣ
′
h(t)
)
dt−
θ
2
h
′
(t)ΣdW η,ξ(t). (12)
We next define the following stochastic exponential given as,
dPh,η,ξ
dPη,ξ
|FT = E(−
θ
2
∫
0
h
′
(t)ΣdW η,ξ(t))T . (13)
From the definition of the class of controls H(T ), it is clear from an application of Novikov’s condition that
P
h,η,ξ is a probability measure. Under this probability measure Ph,η,ξ, the standard result of Girsanov [7]
yields that
Wh,η,ξ(t) ,W η,ξ(t) +
∫ t
0
θ
2
Σ
′
h(s)ds,
is a standard Ph,η,ξ- Brownian motion and the factor process X(t) satisfies the following dynamics
dX(t) = (b+BX(t)− Λ(η
′
(t)X(t) + ξ
′
(t))−
θ
2
ΛΣ
′
h(t))dt+ ΛdWh,η,ξ(t). (14)
Now, under the new probability measure Ph,η,ξ, and using (10)-(12) and (14) we define an auxiliary opti-
mization criterion I(v, x, h, η, ξ, t, T ; θ) given as
I(v, x, h, η, ξ, t, T ; θ) = log v −
2
θ
logEh,η,ξ
[
exp
(
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), h(s), η(s), ξ(s), r(s + t); θ)ds
)]
. (15)
This will lead us to frame the auxiliary game GII that constitutes our first step as stated under the road
map in the Introduction.
Step 1:
In a worst-case risk-sensitive asset management scenario, the investor chooses a portfolio process h so as
to maximize the expected exponential-of-integral performance index I. Then the response of the market
to this choice is to select (η, ξ) (and hence a probability measure)that minimizes the maximum expected
exponential-of-integral performance index. Formally,
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The upper value of this game is given by
u¯(t, x) = sup
h∈H(T )
inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
I(v, x, h, η, ξ, t, T ; θ),
while the lower value of the game is given by
u(t, x) = inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
I(v, x, h, η, ξ, t, T ; θ),
The game has a value provided,
u¯(t, x) = u(t, x) = u(t, x) = I(v, x, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, t, T ; θ). (16)
and hence hˆ, (ηˆ, ξˆ) is a saddle-point equilibrium. We aim to provide a verification lemma for which (16) is
satisfied. In that spirit, consider the exponentially transformed criterion which is simply obtained via the
transformation u˜(t, x) = exp(− θ2u(t, x)). This transformation defines what we call as game GII.
Game (GII)
Obtain hˆ ∈ H(T ) and (ηˆ, ξˆ) ∈ O(T ) such that,
u˜(t, x) = inf
h∈H(T )
sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
Eh,η,ξ[exp{
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), h(s), η(s), ξ(s), r(s + t); θ)ds}v−θ/2],
= sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,η,ξ[exp{
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), h(s), η(s), ξ(s), r(s + t); θ)ds}v−θ/2],
= Ehˆ,ηˆ,ξˆ[exp{
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), hˆ(s), ηˆ(s), ξˆ(s), r(s + t); θ)ds}v−θ/2]. (17)
3. An HJBI equation for game GII.
Step 2:
Let us now define a couplet process Y h,(η,ξ)(t) as
dY h,(η,ξ)(s) =

dY0(s)
dY1(s)

 =

 ds
dX(s)

 =

 ds
(b+BX(s)− Λ(η
′
(s)X(s) + ξ
′
(s))− θ2ΛΣ
′
h(s))dt+ ΛdWh,η,ξ(s)


Y0(0) = s ∈ [0, T ], Y1(0) = y = (y
1, ...yn). The control process h(s) = h(s, ω) is assumed to be Markovian.
Then the process Y h,(η,ξ)(s) is a Markov process whose generator acting on a function u˜(y) ∈ C1,20 ((0, T )×R
n)
where (C1,20 is the space of functions with compact support on (0, T )×R
n such that it is once continuously
differentiable in time and twice continuously differentiable in space variable x) is given by,
A˜h,(η,ξ)u˜(y) =
∂u˜(y)
∂s
+ (b +Bx− Λ(η
′
x+ ξ
′
)−
θ
2
ΛΣ
′
h)
′
Du˜(y) +
1
2
tr(ΛΛ∗D2u˜(y)). (18)
in which Du˜(y) , (∂u˜(y)
∂y1
1
, ...,
∂u˜(y)
∂yn
1
)
′
and D2u˜(y) is the matrix defined as D2u˜(y) , [ ∂
2u˜(y)
∂yi
1
∂yj
1
], i, j = 1, 2, ..., n.
By an application of the Feynman-Kac formula, it can be deduced that the HJB PDE for u˜(y) is given by(
A˜hˆ,(ηˆ,ξˆ) +
θ
2
g(x, hˆ(y), ηˆ, ξˆ, r; θ)
)
u˜(y) = 0. (19)
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The following proposition presents a diagnostic to identify a solution to the game (GII).
Proposition 3.1. Define S = (0, T ) × Rn. Let there exists a function w˜ ∈ C1,2(S) ∩ C(S¯). Suppose there
exists (Markov) control hˆ ∈ H(T ) and deterministic controls (ηˆ, ξˆ) ∈ O(T ) such that for each y ∈ S,
1. (A˜h,(ηˆ,ξˆ) + θ2g(x, h, ηˆ, ξˆ, r; θ))[(w˜(y))] ≥ 0 ∀ h ∈ R
m;
2. (A˜hˆ(y),(η,ξ) + θ2g(x, hˆ(y), η, ξ, r; θ))[(w˜(y))] ≤ 0 ∀ η ∈ R
n×(n+m), ξ ∈ R1×(n+m);
3. (A˜hˆ(y),(ηˆ,ξˆ) + θ2g(x, hˆ(y), ηˆ, ξˆ, r; θ))[(w˜(y))] = 0;
4. [(w˜(T,XT ))] = v
−θ/2.
5. Eh,η,ξ[
∫ T−t
0 Dw˜
′
(t+ s,X(s))ΛeZ˜sdWh,η,ξs ] = 0 ∀ h ∈ R
m, ∀ η ∈ Rn×(n+m), ξ ∈ R1×(n+m);
where,
Z˜(s) = Z˜s(h, η, ξ) :=
θ
2
{∫ s
0
g(X(τ), h(τ), η(τ), ξ(τ), r(t + τ ); θ)dτ
}
. (20)
Define ,
I˜(v, x, h, η, ξ, t, T ; θ) = exp(−
θ
2
I(v, x, h, η, ξ, t, T ; θ))
= Eh,η,ξ[exp{
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), h(s), η(s), ξ(s), r(s + t); θ)ds}v−θ/2].
then,
u˜(0, x) = w˜(0, x) = I˜(v, x, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, 0, T ; θ) = inf
h∈H(T )
{ sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
[I˜(v, x, h, η, ξ, 0, T ; θ)]},
= sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
{ inf
h∈H(T )
[I˜(v, x, h, η, ξ, 0, T ; θ)]},
= sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
I˜(v, x, hˆ, (η, ξ), 0, T ; θ),
= inf
h∈H(T )
I˜(v, x, h, ηˆ, ξˆ, 0, T ; θ) = I˜(v, x, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, 0, T ; θ).
and (hˆ, (ηˆ, ξˆ)) is a saddle point equilibrium.
Proof. Apply Ito’s formula to w˜(s,X(s))eZ˜(s) to obtain
w˜(T,X(T − t))eZ˜(T−t) = w˜(t, x)
+
∫ T−t
0
((A˜h,η,ξ +
θ
2
g(X(s), h(X(s)), η(s), ξ(s), r(s + t); θ))w˜(t+ s,X(s)))eZ˜s)ds
+
∫ T−t
0
(Dw˜
′
(t+ s,X(s))Λ)eZ˜(s)dWh,η,ξ(s). (21)
Taking expectation with respect to Ph,η,ξ , from condition (5) the Proposition , the stochastic integral in
(21) vanishes. Now setting t = 0 and further applying condition (1) and (4) again of the Proposition , we
get
Eh,η,ξ[w˜(T,XT )e
Z˜T ] ≥ w˜(0, x).
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Since this inequality is true for all h ∈ H(T ) we have
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,η,ξ[v−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≥ w˜(0, x).
Hence we have,
sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,η,ξ[v−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≥ inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,η,ξ[v−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≥ w˜(0, x). (22)
Similarly, setting t = 0 we get using conditions (5),(2) and (4) of the Proposition , we get the following upper
value of the game, viz.
inf
h∈H(T )
sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
Eh,η,ξ[v−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
Eh,η,ξ[v−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ w˜(0, x). (23)
Also , setting t = 0 and using conditions (5), (3) and (4) of the Proposition we get,
Ehˆ,(ηˆ,ξˆ)[w˜(T,XT )e
Z˜T ] = w˜(0, x)
= Ehˆ,(ηˆ,ξˆ)[exp{
θ
2
∫ T
0
g(X(s), hˆ(X(s)), ηˆ(s), ξˆ(s), r(s); θ)ds}v−θ/2]. (24)
From (22), (23) and (24), and that
sup(η,ξ)∈O(T ) infh∈H(T )[v
−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ infh∈H(T ) sup(η,ξ)∈O(T )[v
−θ/2eZ˜T ] automatically holds, the conclusion
now follows.
We now return to the game problem involving u as the payoff function.
Corollary 1. u(0, x) = u¯(0, x) = u(0, x)
Proof. The value function u and u˜ are related through the strictly monotone continuous transformation
u˜(t, x) = exp(− θ2u(t, x)). Thus admissible(Optimal) strategies for the exponentially transformed problem u˜
obtained via Proposition 3.1 are also admissible(optimal) for the problem u. In other words,
u(0, x) = sup
h∈H(T )
inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
{[I(v, x, h, η, ξ, 0, T ; θ)]},
= inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
{ sup
h∈H(T )
[I(v, x, h, η, ξ, 0, T ; θ)]},
= inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
I(v, x, hˆ, η, ξ, 0, T ; θ),
= sup
h∈H(T )
I(v, x, h, ηˆ, ξˆ, 0, T ; θ) = I(v, x, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, 0, T ; θ).
Hence u(0, x) = u¯(0, x) = u(0, x).
4. Solving game GII.
Step 3 :
We seek to find the game payoff function u for the game that would satisfy all the conditions of our
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verification lemma given by Proposition 3.1 in terms of u. The Conditions (1)-(4) of verification lemma
could be written in the compact form in terms of u(t, x) as
Ahˆ,ηˆ,ξˆu(t, x) = 0,
u(T, x) = log v. (25)
where the operator Ah,η,ξu(t, x) for any h ∈ Rm and η ∈ Rn×(n+m), ξ ∈ R1×(n+m) is given by,
Ah,η,ξu(t, x) =
∂u(t, x)
∂t
+ (b +Bx− Λ(η
′
(s)X(s) + ξ
′
(s)))−
θ
2
Λ(Σ
′
h))
′
Du(t, x) +
1
2
tr(ΛΛ
′
D2u(t, x))
−
θ
4
(Du(t, x))
′
ΛΛ
′
Du(t, x)− g(x, h, η, ξ, r; θ). (26)
The first order condition for hˆ that maximizes Ah,ηˆ,ξˆ over all H(T ) is given by,
hˆ(t) =
2
(θ + 2)
(ΣΣ
′
)−1[δ(t)− Σ(ηˆ
′
(t)X(t) + ξˆ
′
)−
θ
2
ΣΛ
′
Du(t, x)]. (27)
Substituting (11) in (26) we obtain an expression for the operator Ah,η,ξ in η
′
(t) and ξ
′
(t). We minimize
Ah,η,ξ over the set of controls O(T ). As this operator is linear in η
′
(t) and ξ
′
(t), we guess that the coefficient
of the terms η
′
(t) and ξ
′
(t) vanish2 leading to
hˆ(t) = −(ΣΣ
′
)−1ΣΛ
′
Du(t, x).
Motivated by Kuroda and Nagai [9], we will try the functional form for u given by u(t, x) = 12x
TQ(t)x +
qT (t)x+k(t) where Q is an n×n symmetric matrix, q is a n-element column vector and k is a scalar. Hence
hˆ(t) = −(ΣΣ
′
)−1ΣΛ
′
(Q(t)X(t) + q(t)). (28)
This when substituted in (27) yields,
− ΣΛ
′
(Q(t)X(t) + q(t)) = δ(t)− Σ(ηˆ
′
(t)X(t) + ξˆ
′
(t)). (29)
which further yields,
ηˆ(t) = (Q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
+A
′
)(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σ,
ξˆ(t) =
(
(a− r(t)1)
′
+ q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
)
(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σ.

 (30)
Thus hˆ is a local maximizing control and (ηˆ, ξˆ) is a local minimizer control that constitutes the saddle-point
equilibrium for game (GII).
Remark 4.1. From Remark 2.1 and equation (30), it can be seen that Pηˆ,ξˆ is a minimal martingale measure
provided Q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σ = 0 and q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σ = 0 for t ≤ T .
2Note that η and ξ are bounded, and the resulting conditions applying this guess must also gurantee that the factor process
is indeed stable under the MMM. We show that in Remarks 2.1, 4.1 and 4.2.
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Remark 4.2. From Remark 4.1, and equation (28) it is clear that if the game equilibrium measure corre-
sponds to the minimal martingale measure then the optimal investor strategy satisfies hˆ
′
(t)Σ = 0. Hence if
the portfolio model does not permit short selling then the optimal investor strategy at game equilibrium is
the no-regret strategy i.e (hˆ(t)=0).
Remark 4.3. In the case where the factor process and the security(stock) price process has independent
noise i.e ΣΛ
′
=0 , then from Remarks 4.1-4.2, it is obvious that at optimality, the worst case strategy is the
no-regret strategy and the factor process always evolves under the minimal martingale measure since the
game equilibrium measure is the minimal martingale measure.
As like in Kuroda and Nagai [9], we can verify that u(t, x) = 12x
′
Q(t)x+ q
′
(t)x+ k(t) satisfies the HJB PDE
i.e conditions (1)-(4) of the Proposition 3.1 provided
• an n× n symmetric non-negative matrix Q satisfies the following matrix Riccati equation given as
dQ(t)
dt
−Q(t)K0Q(t) +K
′
1Q(t) +Q(t)K1 = 0 0 ≤ t ≤ T, Q(T ) = 0. (31)
where
K0 =
θ
2
Λ
(
I −
θ − 2
θ
Σ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σ
)
Λ
′
,
K1 = B − Λη
′
(t)− ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
A+ ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
Ση
′
.
• The n element column vector q(t)satisfies the following linear ordinary differential equation
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
dq(t)
dt
+ (K
′
1 −Q(t)K0)q(t) +Q(t)b−Q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1(a− r(t)1)
+ Q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σξ
′
(t)−Q
′
(t)Λξ
′
(t) = 0,
q(T ) = 0. (32)
• and the constant k(t) is a solution to
dk(t)
dt
+ b
′
q(t) +
θ − 2
4
q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1ΣΛ
′
q(t)
+ r − q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1(a− r(t)1) + q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σξ
′
(t)
− ξ(t)Λ
′
q(t) +
2− θ
4
q
′
(t)ΛΛ
′
q(t) = 0
, ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T,
k(T ) = log(v). (33)
The fourth condition of Proposition 3.1 is obvious from the terminal conditions of Q, q and k. To show
that condition (5) of Proposition 3.1 is satisfied by the choice of our payoff function, we need to show that
Eh,(η,ξ)(< Du˜ ΛeZ , Du˜ ΛeZ >t) < ∞ ∀t ∈ [0, T ] where < ·, · > as usual symbolizes quadratic co-variation.
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To show this we argue as follows. Processes Q , (Q(t))0≤t≤T and q , (q(t))0≤t≤T are bounded since they
are continuous on the compact support [0, T ]. By standard existence-uniqueness argument for stochastic
differential equation (refer Gihman and Skorokhod [12]), X ∈ L2(Ph,(η,ξ)). Since Du˜ is linear in X with
controls (η, ξ) assumed bounded, we also have that Du˜ ∈ L2(Ph,η,ξ). To complete the argument it remains
to be shown that u˜ is bounded which we show now.
Lemma 4.1. 0 < u˜ < exp(− θ2
∫ T−t
0 r(s + t)ds)v
−θ/2.
Proof. From the definition of u˜ in (17), for any optimal control O(T ), the strategy hˆ(t) = 0 for t ≤ T is
sub-optimal, and hence will provide an upper bound on u˜. Hence from the definition of g in equation (11)
to obtain the upper bound. Formally we write these statements as,
u˜(t, x) = inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,ηˆ,ξˆ[exp{
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), h(s), ηˆ(s), ξˆ(s), r(s + t); θ)ds}v−θ/2],
≤ E0,ηˆ,ξˆ[exp{
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), 0, ηˆ(s), ξˆ(s), r(s + t); θ)ds}v−θ/2],
= exp(−
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
r(s + t)ds)v−θ/2.
Hence the conclusion follows.
We now formalize the solution to this game (GI).
Step 4:
We first show that the controls belonging to H(T ) and O(T ) satisfy the following change of measure criterion.
Lemma 4.2. From the choice of space of controls h ∈ H(T ) and (η, ξ) ∈ O(T ), we have
E[E
(
−
θ
2
∫
0
[(Q(t)X(t) + q(t))Λ + h
′
(t)Σ]dW η,ξ(t)
)
T
] = 1. (34)
Proof. Above result holds if the following Kazamaki condition,
E[exp(
∫ t
0 θ(
(Q(s)X(s)+q(s))Λ+h
′
(s)Σ
2 )dW
η,ξ(s))] < ∞ ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] is satisfied. By an application of Cauchy-
Schwartz inequality we have ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] ,
E[exp(
∫ t
0
θ(
(Q(s)X(s) + q(s))Λ + (h
′
(s)Σ)
2
)dW η,ξ(s))]
≤ (E[e
∫
t
0
θ(Q(s)X(s)+q(s))ΛdWη,ξ(s)])1/2 × (E[e
∫
t
0
θ(h
′
(s)Σ)dWη,ξ(s)])
1/2
Since X is Gaussian process, mimicking arguments similar to Lemma 2.1, we have that
(E[e
∫
t
0
θ(Q(s)X(s)+q(s))ΛdWη,ξs ])1/2 <∞ ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. From assumption on the space of controls H(T ), one can
conclude that (E[e
∫
t
0
θ(h
′
(s)Σ)dWη,ξ(s)])
1/2
< ∞ for t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence the Kazamaki condition holds true and
the conclusion follows.
We now show that the saddle-point equilibrium controls obtained by solving game (GII) is in fact also a
saddle-point equilibrium for the original game problem (GI).
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Proposition 4.1. If there exist a solution Q to the matrix Ricatti equation (31) , then the saddle point
equilibrium strategies hˆ and (ηˆ, ξˆ) obtained from (28) and (30) respectively as a result of solving the auxiliary
game (GII) where q is a solution to (32) and and k is a solution of (33) is in fact also the saddle-point
equilibrium for the finite horizon game (GI), namely,
sup
h∈Hˆ(T )
inf
(η,ξ)∈Oˆ(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ) = inf
(η,ξ)∈Oˆ(T )
sup
h∈Hˆ(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ),
= J˜(v, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, T ; θ, )
=
1
2
x
′
Q(0)x+ q
′
(0)x+ k(0).
where,
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ) ,
−2
θ
logEη,ξ[exp [
−θ
2
logV h,η,ξ(T )]].
Proof. Define,
Z¯s = Z¯s(h, η, ξ) =
θ
2
{∫ s
0
g(X(τ), h(τ), η(τ), ξ(τ), r(t + τ ); θ)dτ − (h
′
(τ)Σ)dW η,ξ(τ)
−
θ
4
(h
′
(τ)Σ)
′
(h
′
(τ)Σ)dτ
}
. (35)
Also define, χ(t, x) = − θ2 (u(t, x)− log v). From some straightforward calculations provided in the Appendix
we obtain the following relation,
exp{χ(T,X(T − t)) + Z¯(T − t)} = exp(χ(t, x)) exp
[ ∫ T−t
0
−
θ
2
(Ah,η,ξu(t+ s,Xs))ds
−
∫ T−t
0
θ
2
[Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
Λ + (h
′
(t)Σ)]dW η,ξt
−
∫ T−t
0
θ2
8
[Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
+ (h
′
(t)Σ)][Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
+ h
′
(t)Σ]
′
ds
]
.
(36)
We have shown that the saddle-point equilibrium strategies hˆ and (ηˆ, ξˆ) deduced by solving game (GI)
with corresponding game payoff function u satisfies conditions (1)-(5) of Proposition 3.1. Therefore from
condition(4) of Proposition 3.1, we have χ(T, x) = 0. Moreover (V h,η,ξ(T ))
−θ/2
= v−θ/2eZ¯T . Setting t = 0
and taking condition (1) of Proposition 3.1 into account for η = ηˆ, ξ = ξˆ, and for any h ∈ Hˆ(T ) we see from
(35) that
(V h,η,ξ(T ))
−θ/2
≥ e−
θ
2
u(0,x) exp
[
−
∫ T
0
θ
2
[Du(s,X(s))
′
Λ + h
′
(s)Σ]dW η,ξ(s)
−
∫ T
0
θ2
8
[Du(s,X(s))
′
+ h
′
(s)Σ][Du(s,X(s))
′
+ h
′
(s)Σ]
′
ds
]
.
Now by taking expectations w.r.t to the physical probability measure Pη,ξ on both sides of above equation
and using Lemma 4.5, we obtain
14 Amogh Deshpande
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ) ≤ u(0, x).
This inequality is true for all h ∈ H(T ). Hence we have,
sup
h∈H(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ) ≤ u(0, x).
Hence we have,
inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ) ≤ sup
h∈H(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ) ≤ u(0, x). (37)
Likewise, setting t = 0 and taking condition (2) and condition (5) of Proposition 3.1 into account we see
that
sup
h∈H(T )
inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ) ≥ u(0, x) ≥ inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ). (38)
Similarly ,setting t = 0 and taking condition (3) and (5) of Proposition 3.1 into account for h = hˆ, γ = γˆ
such that hˆ ∈ H(T ) and (ηˆ, ξˆ) ∈ O(T ) we see that
J˜(v, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, T ; θ) = u(0, x). (39)
From (37)-(39) and the fact that
suph∈H(T ) inf(η,ξ)∈O(T ) J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ) ≤ inf(η,ξ)∈O(T ) suph∈H(T ) J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ) is automatically true, we
conclude that the saddle-point equilibrium controls obtained by solving game (GII) in fact also constitutes
saddle-point strategy for the original game (GI).
Appendix A.
As part of the proof of Proposition 4.1
Let χ(t, x) = − θ2 (u(t, x)− log v) and Lu(t, x) =
1
2 tr(ΛΛ
′
D2u(t, x)) + (b+ Bx− Λ(η
′
x+ ξ
′
))
′
Du(t, x)
Hence, we have
dχ(t+ s,X(s)) = −
θ
2
(
∂u
∂t
+ Lu)(t+ s,X(s))ds−
θ
2
Du(t+ s,X(s))
′
ΛdW η,ξ(s)
∴
d exp{χ(t+ s,X(s))}
exp{χ(t+ s,X(s))}
= −
θ
2
(
∂u
∂t
(t, x) + Lu)(t+ s,X(s))−
θ
2
Du(t+ s,X(s))
′
ΛdW η,ξ(s)
+
θ2
8
Du
′
ΛΛ
′
Du(t+ s,X(s))ds
∴
d exp{χ(t+ s,X(s))} exp{Z(s)}
exp{χ(t+ s,X(s))} exp{Z(s)}
= −
θ
2
(
∂u
∂t
(t, x) + Lu)(t+ s,X(s))−
θ
2
Du(t+ s,X(s))
′
ΛdW η,ξ(s)
+
θ2
8
Du
′
ΛΛ
′
Du(t+ s,X(s))ds+
θ
2
g(X(t), h(t), η(t), ξ(t), r(s + t); θ)ds
−
θ
2
h
′
(s)ΣdW η,ξ(s) +
θ2
4
h
′
(s)ΣΛ
′
Du(t+ s,X(s))ds
Integrating above equation we yield (36).
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